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Abstract:  Secure  multimedia  communication  enhances  the  safety  of  passengers  by 
providing visual pictures of accidents and danger situations. In this paper we proposed a 
framework  for  secure  multimedia  communication  in  Vehicular  Ad-Hoc  Networks 
(VANETs). Our proposed framework is mainly divided into four components: redundant 
information,  priority  assignment,  malicious  data  verification  and  malicious  node 
verification. The proposed scheme jhas been validated with the help of the NS-2 network 
simulator and the Evalvid tool. 
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1. Introduction 
Multimedia communication has attracted the interest of the research community [1]. Multimedia 
information includes several applications like television, chatting, gaming, internet, video/audio-on-
demand, video conferencing, etc. [2]. Due to the rapid growth of multimedia applications, security is 
an important concern [3]. 
Authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation are the essential security requirements 
of multimedia communication in VANETs. [4] Security attacks (denial of service, malicious node 
attack,  impersonation)  and  vulnerabilities  (forgery,  violation  of  copywrite  and  privacy)  exist  in 
multimedia applications due to the mobility and dynamic nature of VANETs [5]. 
Video transmission in VANETs faces a lot of challenges due to the limited available bandwidth and 
transmission errors [6]. Security, interference, channel fading, dynamic topology changes and lack of 
infrastructure are some other factors that degrade the performance of video streaming in VANETs [7]. 
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  sensor  based  framework  for  secure  multimedia  communication  in 
VANETs. It removes redundant messages and reduces the network load and delays. Malicious nodes 
and malicious data are easily detected with the help of this framework, which is not possible in existing 
approaches. It also prioritizes the network and user traffic so high traffic gets more media than lower 
traffic.  
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we will discuss the security issues of multimedia 
traffic in VANETS and how to detect malicious nodes and data with the help of signal strength and 
vehicle position. In Section 3, we discuss the proposed framework and the results obtained using the 
NS-2 simulator is presented in Section 4. Lastly in Section 5 our conclusion is given. 
2. Related Work 
Maxim et al. [8] presented the need and importance of security in VANETs. In order to fulfill the 
security requirements, they proposed a security architecture which will provide security and privacy. 
VANETs  depend  on  vehicle  to  vehicle  communication,  which  allows  a  malicious  node  to  send 
malicious  data  over  the  network.  Golle  et  al.  [9]  proposed  a  technique  to  detect  and  correct  the 
malicious data in VANETs. His technique is based upon the sensor data, collected by vehicles in the 
VANETs  and  neighbors  information.  Redundant  information  from  neighbors  and  the  position  of 
vehicles help detect the malicious data. 
Xiao et al. [10] proposed a scheme to localize and detect Sybil vehicles in VANETs on the basis of 
the signal strength. With the help of signal strength a vehicle can verify the position of other vehicles 
and eliminate the malicious nodes. Xiao first proposed position verification techniques with the help of 
signal  strength  but  it  still  has  some  shortcomings  i.e.,  spoof  attacks  are  possible  and  data  is 
inconsistent. In order to overcome this weakness, he proposed another solution to prevent malicious 
nodes  in  VANETs.  Two  static algorithms  are proposed with  the  help  of traffic patterns and base 
stations. These algorithms are designed to verify the position of the vehicle and reduce the effect of 
malicious  nodes  on  communication  in  VANETs.  The  following  benefits  are  achieved  by  using  
this algorithm: Sensors 2010, 10                         
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  Error rate is reduced 
  Malicious nodes are easily detected 
  It is not hardware dependent  
In order to improve performance, selfish or malicious nodes must be captured and removed from 
VANETs, but it is very difficult to detect these nodes due to the lack of infrastructure and the dynamic 
nature of VANETs compared to any other ad-hoc networks. Raya et al. [11] also proposed a feasible 
framework adapted to the features of the vehicular environment. It detects and prevents the effects of 
malicious nodes in a VANET scenario. 
3. Proposed Framework 
Our proposed SMBF framework is composed of four modules: Redundant Information, Message 
Benefit, Malicious Node Verification (MNV) and Malicious Data Verification (MDV) as shown in 
Figure 1. SMBF consists of the steps which are given below: 
Step 1) Vehicle A wants to share a safety message with Vehicle B 
Step 2) SMBF sends message to redundant information for verification  
Step 3) On the basis of the reply, SMBF decides to forward or discard the message. 
Step 4) Redundant Messages are discarded 
Step 5) New Information is sent to Message Benefit 
Step 6) Relevance value is sent to SMBF 
Step 7) Request to MNV for malicious node verification 
Step 8) Receive Reply from MNV and decide to forward or discard the message 
Step 9) If the node is malicious, data is discarded 
Step 10) Request is sent to MDV to verify the malicious data 
Step 11) Receive Reply from MDV and decide to forward or discard the message 
Step 12) If the data is malicious, it is discarded 
Step 13) If the node and data are not malicious then it is forwarded to Vehicles  
Figure 1. Secure Multimedia Broadcast Framework (SMBF). 
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Redundant Information: Every node maintains a table of Message IDs of currently received messages. 
We assume that the Message ID is unique and on its basis we detect the redundant messages. 
Message Benefit: We calculate the priority of each message. Safety Messages get higher priority than 
any other messages. 
Malicious Node Verification: We detect the malicious nodes on the basis of signal strength. 
Malicious Data Verification: We detect the malicious data on the basis of existing messages from 
neighbors and also on the basis of the position of nodes. 
4. Implementation and Results 
In this study we evaluate the performance of multimedia streaming in  a VANET scenario. The 
mobility  model  we  use  is  the  Manhattan  Mobility  Model  [12]  and  EvalVid  [13]  generates  the 
multimedia  traffic.  We  perform  the  simulation  with  help  of  NS-2  [14]  on  Cygwin  [15]  and  the 
parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Simulation Settings. 
Parameters  Values 
Channel  Wireless 
Vehicles  3 
MAC protocol  802.11 
Radio Propagation Model  Two-Ray Ground 
Time  50 s 
Data type  multimedia 
4.1. Study I 
We simulate the multimedia traffic in two different scenarios. First we measure the delay, PSNR 
and throughput in scenario where there is no mechanism exists for detection of malicious data and 
malicious node as shown in Figures 2–4.  
 
Figure 2. PNSR. 
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Figure 3. Delay. 
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Figure 4. Throughput. 
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In this study we have three Vehicles (V1, V2 and V3) that are moving at very high speed.V2 and V3 
want to share multimedia traffic with V1 and V2 is a malicious node that sends malicious data to V1 
and affects the performance of network. V1 has no framework to determine the validity of data and it 
considers both V2 and V3  as fair nodes. The delay in this case is higher and throughput is lower 
because of the effect of malicious data. 
4.2. Study 2 
Now  we  consider  the  same  scenario  as  the  above  one.  But  in  this  case  V1  has  the  SMBF  to 
determine the redundant messages, malicious nodes and malicious data. We measure the delay, PSNR 
and throughput by applying the SMBF as shown in Figures 5–7. 
Performance of the network is not affected in this case because MDV detects the malicious data on the 
basis of existing messages from neighbors and also on the basis of the position of nodes, so in this case 
the delay is lower and throughput is higher because the malicious data does not affect the network. Sensors 2010, 10                         
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Figure 5. SMBF PSNR. 
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Figure 6. SMBF Delay. 
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Figure 7. SMBF throughput. 
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4.3. Comparison 
Now we measure the comparison of study I and study II to determine how much delay increases and 
throughput decreases, when there is no framework for the detection of malicious data and malicious 
nodes. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that delay is much lower when SMBF is applied and throughputs 
also increase much more when using SMBF. All vehicles have sensors to detect the congestion and 
improve privacy [16].  
 
Figure 8. Delay Comparison. 
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Figure 9. Throughput Comparison. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have proposed a framework for secure multimedia communication in VANETs. We 
evaluate  the  performance  of  multimedia  data  in  ideal  and  real  scenarios.  Simulation  shows  the Sensors 2010, 10                         
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performance of multimedia traffic in a VANET scenario. We analyze the affect of malicious nodes and 
malicious  data  with  and  without  SMBF.  Results  show  that  the  performance  of  multimedia  traffic 
improved while using SMBF.  
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